Human values and the value of humanities in interdisciplinary research by Robinson, Brian et al.
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2016
Human values and the value of humanities in interdisciplinary research
Robinson, Brian; Vasko, Stephanie E; Gonnerman, Chad; Christen, Markus; O’Rourke, Michael
Abstract: Research integrating the perspectives of different disciplines, or interdisciplinary research, has
become increasingly common in academia and is considered important for its ability to address complex
questions and problems. This mode of research aims to leverage differences among disciplines in generating
a more complex understanding of the research landscape. To interact successfully with other disciplines,
researchers must appreciate their differences, and this requires recognizing how the research landscape
looks from the perspective of other disciplines. One central aspect of these disciplinary perspectives
involves values, and more specifically, the roles that values do, may, and should play in research practice.
It is reasonable to think that disciplines differ in part because of the different views that their practitioners
have on these roles. This paper represents a step in the direction of evaluating this thought. Operating at
the level of academic branches, which comprise relevantly similar disciplines (e.g. social and behavioral
sciences), this paper uses quantitative techniques to investigate whether academic branches differ in
terms of views on the impact of values on research. Somewhat surprisingly, we find very little relation
between differences in these views and differences in academic branch. We discuss these findings from a
philosophical perspective to conclude the paper.
DOI: 10.1080/23311983.2015.1123080
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: http://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-125334
Published Version
 
 
Originally published at:
Robinson, Brian; Vasko, Stephanie E; Gonnerman, Chad; Christen, Markus; O’Rourke, Michael (2016).
Human values and the value of humanities in interdisciplinary research. Cogent Arts Humanities,
3:1123080. DOI: 10.1080/23311983.2015.1123080
Robinson et al., Cogent Arts & Humanities (2016), 3: 1123080
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23311983.2015.1123080
PHILOSOPHY & RELIGION | RESEARCH ARTICLE
Human values and the value of humanities in 
interdisciplinary research
Brian Robinson1*, Stephanie E. Vasko1, Chad Gonnerman2, Markus Christen3 and Michael O’Rourke1
Abstract: Research integrating the perspectives of different disciplines, or interdisci-
plinary research, has become increasingly common in academia and is considered 
important for its ability to address complex questions and problems. This mode of  
research aims to leverage differences among disciplines in generating a more com-
plex understanding of the research landscape. To interact successfully with other dis-
ciplines, researchers must appreciate their differences, and this requires recognizing 
how the research landscape looks from the perspective of other disciplines. One cen-
tral aspect of these disciplinary perspectives involves values, and more specifically, 
the roles that values do, may, and should play in research practice. It is reasonable to 
think that disciplines differ in part because of the different views that their practitio-
ners have on these roles. This paper represents a step in the direction of evaluating 
this thought. Operating at the level of academic branches, which comprise relevantly 
similar disciplines (e.g. social and behavioral sciences), this paper uses quantitative 
techniques to investigate whether academic branches differ in terms of views on 
the impact of values on research. Somewhat surprisingly, we find very little relation 
between differences in these views and differences in academic branch. We discuss 
these findings from a philosophical perspective to conclude the paper.
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1. Introduction
More than 55 years ago, C.P. Snow described the regrettable gap that existed between scientific 
culture and the culture of the humanities and the arts. It would be much better for all of us, he 
argued, if there could be meaningful interaction between these two cultures (Snow, 1959). To a first 
approximation, scientists make judgments based on data: they employ empirical methods designed 
to transform data into evidence that bears on hypotheses about how things stand with the actual 
world. Humanists, by contrast, rely on narrative and conceptual methods to understand and enrich 
the human condition. By highlighting the clarifying power of the individual moment and the trans-
formational influence of imagining the possible, the humanities leverage empathic identification in 
exploring what is it to be a human being in a vast universe. Whether or not you believe that the gap 
remains as wide as ever,1 it certainly remains true that it is worth working to bridge the gap between 
the sciences and arts and humanities in order to bring the different cultures into productive 
convergence.2
This is an article about the productive convergence of humanities with science. It is an interdisci-
plinary effort based in the humanities that closes the culture gap along two dimensions, namely, the 
collaboration dimension (i.e. who is involved) and the content dimension (i.e. what is involved). Along 
the collaboration dimension, our primary emphasis is the work of the Toolbox Project (http://toolbox-
project.org/), a US National Science Foundation-funded humanities initiative that exemplifies a com-
mitment to bridging the gap between the academic cultures by employing humanistic insights to 
enhance scientific processes. Specifically, the Toolbox Project utilizes philosophical concepts and 
methods in dialogue-based workshops to enhance communication in collaborative inter-, cross-, 
and transdisciplinary sciences (Eigenbrode et al., 2007; O’Rourke & Crowley, 2013). In addition, it is 
important to note that as a team with training in philosophy, neuroinformatics, and the physical sci-
ences, the authors have combined research perspectives in a reflexive way designed to minimize the 
potential for prodigious cultural “incomprehension” (Snow, 1959, p. 12).
Along the content dimension, we develop an instance of productive convergence that involves the 
complex role of values in scientific practice. By “values” in this context, we mean “scientific values” 
or “good-making” features such as fairness, objectivity, and democratic participation that function 
(or ought to function) as constraints on reasoning and action in the context of scientific research. 
Held by both the scientific community and by individual scientists, values help underwrite important 
theoretical principles of knowledge production—what we will call “epistemic values”—as well as 
non-epistemic principles of conduct. Given that these good-making features are the subject of 
humanistic investigation in philosophy, literature, history, and elsewhere and that they figure impor-
tantly into the practice of scientific research, they can serve as a ground for collaborative interaction 
between the humanities and the sciences. Further, we adopt a methodological posture that com-
bines a philosophical perspective on values in science with quantitative data analysis techniques 
drawn from the sciences. In particular, using data generated in dialogue-driven workshops about 
the philosophical dimensions of scientific practice, we use quantitative techniques to examine 
whether there are any interesting differences in attitudes and commitments toward values in sci-
ence across academic branches represented in interdisciplinary research projects.3 Thus, the con-
tent of our story exhibits the convergence of the humanities and the sciences, both in terms of what 
it is about and how we tell it.
We begin our interdisciplinary story in the next section with more detailed descriptions of the col-
laboration and content dimensions of our effort to bridge the culture gap, focusing specifically on 
the Toolbox Project and on values in science. It is there that we provide context for the specific 
research question that guides our analysis, viz., are there predictable differences in attitude about 
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values that are correlated with differences in academic branch? After describing our methods, we 
discuss the results of our analysis. We conclude with a discussion section in which we highlight a few 
implications of our data and analysis for efforts to bridge the culture gap.
2. Collaboration and content
In this section, we provide additional details about the two principal dimensions of this project, col-
laboration and content. First, we describe the Toolbox Project, an effort that functions as a collabora-
tive confluence of humanistic and scientific thinking. We address both the motivation behind the 
project and the character of its response. Second, we discuss values in science, the topic that consti-
tutes the content of our analysis.
2.1. The collaboration dimension: the Toolbox Project
Collaborative interdisciplinary research essentially involves bringing different disciplinary perspec-
tives into contact with each other, often in the service of addressing complex problems that extend 
beyond the ambit of any one discipline. These perspectives figure into the constitution of disciplinary 
cultures, which comprise the social, material, and epistemic conditions on our experience, framing 
both perception and interpretation (cf. Galison, 2006). Cultures can make certain ways of seeing and 
knowing “natural,” which can make alternative perspectives appear foreign and even incomprehen-
sible (Crowley, Eigenbrode, O’Rourke, & Wulfhorst, 2010). One way to think of this phenomenon in 
the research context is in terms of “academic tribalism,” or the notion that academics in the same 
discipline are “united by customs, tradition, and adherence to a largely common worldview” 
(Sternberg, 2014). Among the problems that are created by academic tribalism, Sternberg (2014) 
lists “uniformity of point of view” and “rejection of interdisciplinarity,” both of which undermine 
meaningful interdisciplinary integration (O’Rourke, Crowley, & Gonnerman, in press). In talking about 
these problems, Miller et al. (2008) discuss researchers who operate within “epistemological silos” 
adhere to disciplinary boundaries and seek “… to acquire and validate knowledge” from their own 
epistemological perspective. This siloing can lead to the inability of researchers to shift their discipli-
nary perspectives, or their general way of looking at or thinking about research space, conditioned 
by tacit assumptions and commitments instilled or reinforced by their disciplinary experiences 
(Eigenbrode et al., 2007).
Humanistic thinking, and in particular the history and philosophy of science, has helped diagnose 
problems associated with academic tribalism, and this type of thinking can also help remediate 
them. One of the central humanistic insights about these problems, emphasized, for example, by 
feminist epistemologists and philosophers of science (e.g. Harding, 1993) is that greater awareness 
of hard-to-access disciplinary assumptions and commitments can be promoted through interac-
tions with individuals who do not share those assumptions and commitments. Such an individual 
can function as a “stranger” (Simmel, 1921) or an “outsider within” (Collins, 1986; Merton, 1972), 
who is better able to spot theoretical features that emerge from unquestioned assumptions and 
commitments, especially when the assumptions or commitments are not shared. In a interdiscipli-
nary collaboration, each project member can play the role of the “outsider within” for other mem-
bers by virtue of their different worldviews, perspectives, experiences, etc; thus, so long as differences 
in worldview are harnessed in a way that illuminates potentially divisive variations in perspective, 
the source of the malady can also be the source of its cure.
The Toolbox Project is motivated by the goal of facilitating the identification of these differences 
in worldview so that interdisciplinary collaborations can mine them, rather than be undermined by 
them. Heightened collective reflexivity about these differences can put collaborators in a position to 
appreciate the potential for confusion and disagreement (Gonnerman, O’Rourke, Crowley, & Hall, 
2015), enabling members of the project team to see the research landscape through each other’s 
eyes (Looney et al., 2013). The principal vehicle for facilitating this appreciation is a two- to three-
hour Toolbox workshop that centers on a semi-structured philosophical dialogue among collabora-
tors (O’Rourke & Crowley, 2013). Contributions to these dialogues are prompted by a survey 
instrument—the “Toolbox”—designed to reveal the tacit assumptions and commitments that 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [8
3.7
8.2
46
.13
7]
 at
 08
:18
 07
 Ja
nu
ary
 20
16
 
Page 4 of 16
Robinson et al., Cogent Arts & Humanities (2016), 3: 1123080
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23311983.2015.1123080
condition various aspects of disciplinary research practice. Typically, Toolbox instruments are de-
signed to suit a particular collaboration, highlighting the assumptions and commitments that are 
operative in its particular context. The dialogues these instruments structure often include revela-
tion of surprising difference, negotiation of conflicting perspectives, and an increase in mutual un-
derstanding (Schnapp, Rotschy, Hall, Crowley, & O’Rourke, 2012).
A Toolbox survey instrument comprises a number of prompts that articulate or closely connect up 
with positions on issues that frame scientific research, such as “Scientific research must be hypoth-
esis driven” and “Scientific research aims to identify facts about a world independent of the investi-
gators.” These prompts are selected because they get at different ways of understanding research, 
including its objects and uses, e.g. whether one regards hypothesis formation and testing as key to 
an adequate research design, or whether scientific researchers are inevitably implicated in their own 
research findings. The instrument asks participants to rate their agreement with these prompts on a 
five-point Likert scale (1 “Disagree” to 5 “Agree,” along with “I don’t know” and “N/A”). The prompts 
are organized into modules, or sets that center on a specific philosophical theme articulated in the 
form of a core question. For example, the Science–Technology–Engineering–Mathematics (STEM) 
instrument, which is the instrument of concern in this article, consists of six modules that concern 
fundamental aspects of the epistemology and metaphysics of science, including Methodology, 
Confirmation, and Values (Looney et al., 2013). Our focus is the Values module contained in the STEM 
instrument, which is built around the core question, “Do values negatively influence scientific 
research?” The prompts contained in the Values module are described below.
2.2. The content dimension: values in science
For more than 60 years, philosophers of science have put forward a wide variety of positions on the 
relationship between non-epistemic values and scientific research. As we suggested above, non-
epistemic values comprise good-making features of individuals and societies (e.g. justice) that differ 
from the good-making, theoretical features of scientific knowledge production, especially insofar as 
truth is concerned (i.e. epistemic values, such as explanatory scope or objectivity). To a large extent, 
the Toolbox Values module emerges out of a close study of this literature. What follows are the five 
main prompts in the module, along with the philosophical positions that helped inspire them.
(1)  “Objectivity implies an absence of values by the researcher.” Longino (1990, 2002) argues that 
scientific objectivity does not require that individual scientists be value-neutral; instead, objec-
tivity emerges from community criticism.
(2)  “Incorporating one’s personal perspective in framing a research question is never valid.” 
Harding (1986, 1987) defends the claim that value orientations, such as those related to gen-
der, may legitimately influence the framing of research questions in science.
(3)  “Value-neutral scientific research is possible.” Defenders of the value-free ideal (e.g. Poincaré, 
1958, p. 12)—i.e. the idea that science should aim to be free of the influence of non-epistemic 
values—would contend that in some facets of science, such as when deciding whether to 
accept a hypothesis in light of the available evidence, the influence of non-epistemic values 
should be minimized (cf. Lacey, 1999).
(4)  “Determining what constitutes acceptable validation of research data is a value issue.” Rudner 
(1953) and Douglas (2000) argue that non-epistemic values may influence decisions about 
whether the available evidence is sufficient for accepting a scientific claim, as when the con-
sequences of accepting the claim would be intolerably bad were the claim to turn out false, 
despite the available evidence.
(5)  “Allowing values to influence scientific research is advocacy.” Kourany (2003) defends the 
claim that scientists have a responsibility to advocate for socially significant goals about which 
they have expertise, such as public health. 4
As we noted above, the literature on interdisciplinarity commonly regards differences between 
disciplines as a great obstacle to effective interdisciplinary team collaboration (e.g. Benda et al., 
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2002; Eigenbrode et al., 2007; Miller et al., 2008). As Lélé and Norgaard (2005) observe, these differ-
ences include epistemic value differences that arise out of diverse types of training and ways of 
conducting research (e.g. different choices of “variables and models,” p. 975). These epistemic dif-
ferences are an integral part of disciplinary culture, a point made by Becher and Trowler, who write, 
“in practice, academic cultures and disciplinary epistemology are inseparably entwined … discipli-
nary knowledge forms are to a large extent constituted and instantiated socially” (2011, p. 23). But 
non-epistemic values are also implicated in interdisciplinary work. Fisher et al. make an observation 
about non-epistemic values, noting that “divergences between human value dimensions and tech-
nical rationalities” constitute a “socio-technical divide” that is often manifest in collaborative inter-
disciplinary projects that focus on socially relevant problems (2015, p. 3).
These observations suggest that we should expect some disciplinary pattern to emerge in partici-
pant responses to the five Toolbox Values prompts, and this suggestion is the source of our initial 
research question: Are there predictable differences in attitude about values that are correlated with 
differences in academic branch? As we will discuss below, we opt to evaluate academic branches 
rather than disciplines under pressure from our data-set, but the interest remains the same: Are 
perspectives on values in science as articulated in the five prompts among the differences that 
divide different domains of science?
3. Methods
To investigate variance in attitudes toward values across academic branches, we examined Likert 
responses from participants in 43 workshops conducted by the Toolbox Project between March 2009 
and October 2013. Since 2005, more than 160 Toolbox workshops have been conducted with over 
1,400 participants. Of these workshops, these43 workshops were selected for our sample because 
(a) they were conducted with cross-disciplinary research teams collaborating on a joint project and 
(b) they used the STEM Toolbox instrument. These workshops had 355 participants (127 female), 
ranging from graduate students to senior researchers with over 20 years of research experience. Of 
the 43 workshops, all of them had multiple disciplines represented, and all but one had multiple aca-
demic branches represented.
A Toolbox workshop begins with participants completing a Toolbox instrument, which includes a 
demographic table along with the Likert items described above. Among the demographic variables 
is disciplinary identity, specifically, which discipline(s) constitute a participant’s “primary identity.” 
Participants provided up to four open-ended disciplinary specifications in numbered spaces. As there 
were no constraints on these specifications, it was often unclear in our sample just how closely 
aligned participants were in terms of their disciplinary identity. To normalize disciplinary specifica-
tion, we coded responses using a comprehensive and systematic discipline taxonomy. We focused 
on the item listed in the first of the four numbered spaces in each demographic table, which we took 
to be the most salient disciplinary affiliation for participants who listed more than one, and so the 
principal disciplinary component of these more complex identities. Two co-authors categorized 
these disciplinary specifications using the Digital Commons Three-Tiered Taxonomy of Academic 
Disciplines (Bepress, 2014).5 The raters independently associated the first item listed with a discipline 
in the taxonomy, noting the academic branch under which that discipline is classified. For instance, 
the discipline Philosophy falls under the academic branch Arts and Humanities; Bioinformatics is 
under Life Sciences; and Earth Sciences is under Physical Sciences and Mathematics. Each partici-
pant was thus associated with both a primary discipline and academic branch for the purposes of 
subsequent analysis.
Given that the number of disciplines is high, with over 330 disciplines included in Bepress, 2014, we 
were not able to populate the disciplinary categories from our sample in sufficient numbers to justify 
analysis at the disciplinary level. This problem was resolved, however, by shifting the evaluation to 
the level of the academic branch (Table 1). Therefore, our analysis examines whether there are dif-
ferences among academic branches. This method assumes that any differences between two disci-
plines in the same academic branch will be minor compared to differences between any two 
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academic branches. For instance, Economics and Political Science, both members of Social and 
Behavioral Sciences, likely differ in their research worldviews or in their philosophical assumptions 
and commitments regarding the practice of science, but we assume that these differences tend to 
be minor by comparison with the differences that obtained between Social and Behavioral Sciences 
and the Physical Sciences and Mathematics branch. Although much of the literature on the integra-
tive challenges to interdisciplinary research describes these challenges in terms of disciplines, we 
argue that it is legitimate to pursue our research question at this level because of the taxonomic 
nature of knowledge organization. As exhibited by the Bepress’s (2014) taxonomy, disciplines can be 
organized by various epistemic and ontological affinities into broader branches that inherit some of 
the epistemic and ontological characters of their constituent disciplines; for this reason, it is legiti-
mate to expect integrative challenges of the sort that motivate the Toolbox Project to percolate up 
to the level of the academic branch.
We predicted that some pattern at the level of academic branch will emerge from participants’ 
responses to the five Toolbox Values prompts. Since our inquiry into the distribution of views values 
in science is exploratory, our prediction remains non-specific. We did not, for example, predict what 
views on value neutrality are associated with the academic branches. We tested the expectation 
that there will be differential patterning across academic branches in two ways. First, organizing 
participants into academic branches, we analyzed participant responses to each Values prompt 
individually to determine if any statistically significant difference can be found between academic 
branches. For any prompts showing a significant difference among the academic branches, we used 
a follow-up analysis to look for where the significant difference lies, i.e. which academic branches 
are statistically distinguishable by means of that prompt.
Second, we determined the similarity of the answers by transforming the answers of each partici-
pant into a vector whose components correspond to the chosen Likert scale values and calculating 
their pairwise Euclidean (i.e. straight-line) distance.6 The resulting distance matrix was used in two 
different ways for cluster analysis. First, we used a standard algorithm for identifying clusters in the 
data, a variant of k-means clustering, implemented in Mathematica. Second, we employed a super-
paramagnetic agent visualization technique to look for how the Toolbox participants cluster based 
on their responses to the Values prompts collectively.7 This method of analysis produces a map 
depicting every participant as a dot. The position of each participant on the map is determined in 
relation to every other participant based on how similar their responses are to each other. Participants 
with very similar answers are closer together, while those with highly dissimilar answers are quite far 
apart. For instance, suppose participant A responded 1 (“Disagree”) to all the Values prompts, par-
ticipant B responded 5 (“Agree”), and participant C responded 1 to four of the prompts and 2 to the 
fifth. In this case, A and C would be mapped closely together and far apart from B. Once all the par-
ticipants have been plotted, we can look for groups of participants that have clustered together 
Table 1. Summary of participants’ academic families as determined by two raters
Notes: The Digital Commons Three-Tiered Taxonomy of Academic Disciplines has 10 academic branches, of which we 
had participants from 8. Missing from our list are the branches Law and Architecture, from which we had no participants.
Academic braches Total participants
Life Sciences 134
Physical Sciences and Mathematics 72
Social and Behavioral Sciences 58
Engineering 34
Medicine and Health Sciences 17
Arts and Humanities 8
Education 10
Business 2
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based on their similar response patterns. The superparamagnetic agent mapping technique ana-
lyzes the similarity of participants and maps them independently of their academic branch. We then 
colored participants on the map according to their academic branches. While the superparamag-
netic agent mapping plots participants relative to each other based on the similarity of their 
responses, it may not be immediately clear from looking at the map how many clusters there are (if 
any) or what the boundaries of any cluster are. Thus, the k-means clustering algorithm was also 
applied to the resulting SAM map by taking the coordinates of the points on the map as input for 
calculating the distance matrix. This way, we are not left to subjectively interpret how close two dots 
look to each other. We then predicted that at least some of the clusters that emerged in either way 
(k-means or SAM) would be based on academic branch.
4. Results
The raters initially excluded nine participants for providing responses that did not correspond to any 
discipline in the taxonomy, such as “policy” and “grant administration.” For academic branches, the 
two raters achieved a relatively high degree of correspondence (κ  =  0.82), differing on 54 of the 
remaining 346 participants. Forty-three of these differences were resolved; the 11 participants about 
whom disagreement remained were excluded from subsequent analysis. The results are summa-
rized in Table 1.
Most heavily represented in our sample were the science branches and engineering; the dearth of 
representatives in arts and the humanities is worth noting and will be addressed in the Discussion 
section. Given the unequal distribution of participants across the academic branches, some branch-
es had to be excluded from the statistical analyses of each prompt. For instance, Business was ex-
cluded because a sample of two participants is too small to support inferences about Business as a 
whole from their responses. For the k-means clustering analysis and the superparamagnetic agent 
mapping, however, all participants for whom an academic branch could be ascertained (335) are 
retained since those analyses only look for similarity between individual participants’ responses, 
regardless of their academic affiliation.
To visualize the variance in the data, we produced weighted scatterplots of responses by aca-
demic branch (Figure 1). Each academic branch is represented on the X-axis, with each of the five 
Likert responses on the Y-axis. For each branch, we plotted a dot on each of the Likert values that 
participants of that academic branch gave. In the case of Values 1, for instance, participants from 
Arts and Humanities only responded 1, 2, or 5, and so dots only appear for those Likert values for this 
branch. We then made the size of each dot proportional to the percentage of participants giving that 
response.8 The key point worthy of note from this visualization is how widely distributed the re-
sponses were. Participants gave a wide range of responses to each prompt. With very few excep-
tions, each of the possible responses (1–5) was recorded for each prompt and for each academic 
branch.
Next, we compared the branches to each other to determine if there were any significant differ-
ences for each prompt. For this analysis, we used the Kruskal–Wallis H test.9 This test takes the null 
hypothesis that for a given prompt, the medians of each academic branch are equal (MdnLife 
Sciences = MdnPhysical Sciences & Mathematics = MdnSocial & Behavioral Sciences=MdnArts & Humanities = MdnMedical Sciences = MdnEngineering 
= MdnEducation). This null hypothesis is rejected if the probability of the data given this null hypothesis is 
less than 5% (p < 0.05). Thus, when the null hypothesis is rejected, it means that there is a statistically 
significant amount of variance between branches. A series of follow-up analyses are necessary to 
attempt to determine which branches are statistically distinguishable by the prompt in question. 
Table 1A in Appendix 1 summarizes the results for the Kruskal–Wallis tests of each prompt, where 
Business was excluded. There were statically significant differences between academic branches for 
Values 2, “Incorporating one’s personal perspective in framing a research question is never valid” 
(H(6) = 17.81, p = 0.007) and Values 3, “Value-neutral scientific research is possible” (H(6) = 18.96, 
p = 0.004).10
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To tease apart the nature of these results, we conducted a follow-up analysis of Values 2 and 
Values 3 using the Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon (MWW) test. For each prompt, this test conducts a se-
ries of pairwise comparisons, separately comparing each branch’s median to every other branch’s 
median. We can then determine which pair(s) of branches are different from one another in a statis-
tically significant manner. In order for the MWW test to return results, academic branches with 
fewer participants had to be excluded from the analysis. Thus, the follow-up analysis could only in-
clude Life Sciences, Physical Sciences and Mathematics, Social and Behavioral Sciences, and 
Figure 1. Summary of Likert 
responses by academic branch 
for each values prompt.
Note: The color-blind friendly 
color palette for Figures 1 and 
2 were adapted from Okabe 
and Ito (2002).
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Engineering. The means for each of these four branches and the differences between them are 
represented in Figure 2. The full results of the MWW tests are summarized in Table 2A in Appendix 1.
The MWW tests found only one pairwise comparison that showed statistically significant differ-
ence after decreasing the likelihood of a Type I error (i.e. a false positive).11 Participants in Social and 
Behavioral Sciences (Mdn = 2) were significantly less likely to agree with Values 3 (that value-neutral 
scientific research is possible) than were participants in Life Sciences (Mdn = 3) (W = 4639, p = 0.002). 
The means of the other three academic branches on this issue are around the mid-point. The differ-
ences between Social and Behavioral Sciences and both Engineering (W = 1210, p = 0.03) and also 
Physical Sciences and Mathematics (W  =  2586.5, p  =  0.006) were nearly significant. No pairwise 
comparisons were significant for Values 2, though the difference between Social and Behavioral 
Sciences and Physical Sciences and Mathematics was nearly significant (W = 2432.5, p = 0.03). It is 
possible that the significant result for Values 2 from the Kruskal–Wallis H test was due to a difference 
involving one of the academic branches that had to be excluded from the MWW tests.
The analysis presented so far looked for differences between academic branches relative to indi-
vidual prompts. All these prompts belong to the Values module and were all originally designed to 
motivate discussion of issues related to the module’s core question, “Do values negatively influence 
scientific research?” (Eigenbrode et al., 2007). A reasonable question, then, is whether there is any 
branch-based pattern in participant responses across all five Values prompts? For example: Do par-
ticipants belonging to the Social and Behavioral Sciences branch tend to respond in roughly the 
same way to all five prompts, and if so, are they distinct from all other academic branches or partici-
pants from other branches also respond in a similar fashion? To answer these questions, we use the 
k-means clustering algorithm and the superparamagnetic agent mapping technique explained in 
Section 3 to look for clusters of similar response patterns among our participants across all five 
Values prompts.12 We indeed found 17 clusters using k-means clustering, but they did not corre-
spond to the academic branches.13 Also, the resulting SAM map (not shown) did not display any 
clustering along disciplines.
One possible explanation of the lack of clusters corresponding to academic branches is that some 
of the prompts were too noisy, i.e. they were not accurately capturing differences between branches. 
Figure 2. Summary of means 
for the Values 2 and 3 prompts 
by academic branch. Error bars 
indicate ±1 standard deviation.
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The Kruskal–Wallis H tests revealed precisely this result. Both Values 1 (H(6) = 4.22, p = 0.65) and 
Values 5 (H(6) = 6.81, p = 0.38) were far from statistically significant, giving us some reason to think 
that academic disciplines do not explain variances in responses to these prompts. We suspected 
that we would find the predicted clustering by academic branch when using only the answers for 
Values 2 to 4 for calculating the distance matrix. However, the result was negative again. Although 
k-means clustering found eight clusters, they were completely unspecific regarding academic 
branches. The same holds for SAM mapping as Figure 3 shows. We remind the reader that each dot 
represents a participant, color-coded based on academic branch. If there were a correspondence 
between identified clusters and academic branches, most of the dots of the same color would have 
been clustered together or at least located in the same region of the plane, instead of being spread 
all over the map as seen here.
We take this result to be somewhat surprising since it indicates that interdisciplinary researchers’ 
views on the issues raised in Values 2 to 4 do not conform to any pattern based on academic branch-
es. Rather, researchers are scattered about the map, showing a wide diversity of views across aca-
demic branches. Though we set out to find difference among academic branches, we found very 
little by examining the prompts individually or collectively. We consider below how to interpret these 
null results.
5. Discussion of results
At the outset, we predicted that clear differences would emerge based on the academic branch to 
which participants belong. Contrary to our prediction, we largely did not find the expected branch-
level divides. The only difference we did find was that social and behavioral scientists were signifi-
cantly less willing to agree that value-neutral scientific research is possible than were life scientists. 
This result is not too surprising since researchers in the Social and Behavioral Sciences will have been 
influenced by post-positivism and its embrace of values as a key part of the scientific process (cf. 
Figure 3 Results of 
superparamagnetic agent 
mapping for participant 
responses to Values 2 to 4 
and color coded by academic 
branch.
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Lélé & Norgaard, 2005). Even more interesting than the lack of branch-level divides was the lack of 
any clustering of researchers according to academic branch.
If we only considered the statistical tests that examined prompts individually, it would be hard to 
make much of these results. Not finding significant differences doesn’t confirm the null hypotheses 
that there are none. The lack of branch-based clustering produced by superparamagnetic agent 
mapping is a different story, however. Rather than testing a null hypothesis to see if it should be re-
jected, it produces a map that groups the participants based on similarities in their answers. 
Therefore, the lack of clustering based on branches is an interpretable result, whereas that is not in 
general true of the failure to reject a null hypothesis. Furthermore, the fact that both methods did 
not find branch-based differences represents convergent evidence that there are no such differ-
ences here. The combination of the lack of clustering according to branches and the failure to find 
statistically significant differences suggests a few conclusions. First, recall that our data show that 
researchers supplied a wide diversity of responses to our prompts on values in science (see Figure 1). 
This indicates that the lack of clustering is not due to researchers generally having the same views, 
regardless of academic branch; rather, our findings suggest that interdisciplinary researchers have a 
diversity of views about value-neutral inquiry and that this diversity is not based on the academic 
branch to which a researcher belongs. Second, while the differences may be individual or based on 
some other demographic factor, they do not seem to be based on academic branch. Third, if this 
tentative conclusion is correct, and further investigation is warranted, then it suggests that some 
differences one might expect to be revealed and managed by the careful negotiation of differences 
in research worldview may in fact be left unaddressed. Some important differences (like whether 
value-neutral scientific inquiry is possible) that could be obstacles for successful collaboration might 
transcend research domains.
Of course, our analysis has focused on differences at the academic branch level, leaving open the 
question of whether there are statistically significant differences in attitudes toward values at the 
disciplinary level. That we might still expect differences at this level, in spite of the results we report 
in this paper, is motivated by the idea of academic tribalism/siloing, which suggests that it is reason-
able to expect disciplines to differ in various ways as a result of differences in “customs, tradition, 
and adherence to a largely common worldview” (Sternberg, 2014). While we have emphasized that 
analysis at the level of individual disciplines would be ideal, this remains a step for future research. 
One way to determine if there is a tribalism/siloing effect across disciplines is to gain greater repre-
sentation from disciplines in Medicine and Health Sciences, Arts and Humanities, Education, and 
Business, either in focused surveys on questions raised here or in future Toolbox sessions. We can 
also explore the question using qualitative methods, such as textual analysis of Toolbox dialogues 
and participant interviews focused on formation of disciplinary identity and the development of 
values that influence research. If attitudes toward prompts such as “Value-neutral scientific re-
search is possible” are socially constructed in the disciplines, then we should observe this through 
interviews and exploration of the data at discipline granularity.
One important fact about our sample that we have not addressed is the paucity of humanists 
engaged in interdisciplinary collaboration with the sciences. The Toolbox Project has collaborated 
with a large number of scientific research projects that represent a broad spectrum of interests and 
are funded by a variety of agencies, including NSF, NIH, and USDA-NIFA. If a sizeable percentage of 
these collaborations involved humanists as members, that would be a salutary sign that the culture 
gap is closing; however, of the 346 participants included in our sample, only 8 self-identified as be-
longing to the Arts and Humanities as their primary disciplinary identity. One might take this to 
mean that humanists have little to contribute, but this would be a mistake. Rather, it means that few 
in the sciences are aware of what a humanist can contribute, and further, few in the humanities are 
aware of it either. Following Snow, we submit that the lack of interdisciplinary interaction involving 
scientists and humanists is less about hostility and more about mutual ignorance. As Snow put it, 
“They have a curious distorted image of each other” (p. 4).
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Our data-set, then, evinces the an important culture gap. The Arts and Humanities appears to re-
main largely excluded from interdisciplinary research with the sciences. While our study does not 
offer evidence about the etiology or extent of the gap, it does suggest that it remains in place. 
Although we are not in a position to comment on causes—on why, based on our sample, there are 
so few humanists—we are in a position to argue for the value and relevance of humanities scholar-
ship to interdisciplinary science. More should be done to impress on scientists and humanists alike 
that there would be mutual value in collaborating, and in particular, collaborating on funded scien-
tific projects.14
It is important to emphasize that this mutual value is not incidental but is in fact central to the 
mission of the sciences. Embedding scientific results in the arts and humanities—e.g. arts projects, 
writing projects, and historical inquiry—is one way to connect the humanities with complex, inter-
disciplinary science projects (Goralnik, Nelson, Ryan, & Gosnell, 2015); however, applying science in 
humanistic contexts tends to be regarded as inessential and peripheral by those engaged in the 
scientific work. These count as broader impacts of the science, rather than essential moves made as 
part of a project’s intellectual merit (http://www.nsf.gov/bfa/dias/policy/merit_review/; for discus-
sion, see Holbrook, 2005). We are interested in bridging the humanities with the sciences in a way 
that demonstrates how the humanities can be relevant to the intellectual merit of these projects.
Humanists are not typically trained to address the technical aspects of scientific data collection 
and analysis (though philosophers of science are increasingly an exception to this trend), but they 
are trained to evaluate the humanistic aspects of scientific practice, which leaves much to do in a 
typical scientific project. We conclude our discussion with brief descriptions of three specific contri-
butions that humanities can make to the intellectual merit of a collaborative interdisciplinary pro-
ject. (This list is meant to be illustrative and not exhaustive.)
(1)  Serve as vectors of clarity and criticism about values. As we have noted, values that figure into 
science can be epistemic or non-epistemic. An important type of non-epistemic value is ethical 
values, and humanists are in an especially strong position to contribute to science projects by 
clarifying these values. This is evident in the work that philosophers do on responsible conduct 
of research and the role they play in larger projects as contributors to an understanding of 
ethics in science. NSF and NIH recognize this by highlighting ethics as a key part of scientific 
and biomedical projects. There is also reason to see ethical values as standing in important, 
“coupled” relationships with epistemic values, establishing interrelated assemblies of value in 
the context of science (Tuana, 2010). Given this more complex picture, Tuana (2013) argues 
that in addition to clarifying ethical issues of accountability and responsibility, “rendering … 
values transparent and examining their coupled ethical-epistemic significance is an important 
and often under-appreciated resource for more objective science” (p. 1957).
(2)  Encourage reflexivity on the part of collaborators concerning their role(s) as scientists and 
human beings. It is valuable for scientists to recognize that they bring to scientific work a 
whole host of assumptions and commitments. The tricky thing about disciplinary assumptions 
and commitments is that they are often quite hard to spot by those within the discipline, op-
erating something like the bottom part of an iceberg, shaping what is visible above the waters 
but remaining well below what is directly visible. As we suggested above, the Toolbox Project 
aims to encourage reflexivity by structuring dialogue among collaborators in cross-discipli-
nary projects who have different assumptions and commitments, which can reveal potential 
obstacles to efficient and effective cross-disciplinary practice (Gonnerman et al., 2015).
(3)  Support the accountability of complex projects to each other and to non-research stakeholders. 
The narrative of a complex science project matters—it is, for example, a critical part of ac-
counting for the value of science and communicating that value, to other scientists, to funding 
agencies, and to non-scientists (Huutoniemi, 2015). Humanists have the ability to aid in the 
communication and dissemination of projects, and in so doing, frame the reception and 
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interpretation of scientific results. This is key as projects become more transdisciplinary and 
participatory (Hall & O’Rourke, 2014).
6. Conclusion
This work described in this paper reflects humanistic thinking and represents two different ways in 
which the culture gap can be bridged. First, the data on which the results reported above are based 
come from the work of the Toolbox Project, and specifically, from responses to the Toolbox instru-
ment, a set of 34 prompts designed to draw out the views of scientists on some of the philosophical 
dimensions of their work. Importantly, the development of this instrument was a collaborative effort, 
with both philosophers and scientists contributing, and involved a careful review of the philosophical 
literature on non-epistemic values in science. The Toolbox Project continues to be a humanistic pro-
ject that aims to deploy philosophical concepts and methods to facilitate improvement in scientific 
process, and so our collaboration works as a case study of how one might bridge the culture gap. 
Second, the data emerge out of efforts by interdisciplinary scientists and researchers to understand 
the role that values do and should play in their research. These are matters of central concern to the 
humanities more generally and philosophy more specifically, and so the content of our article repre-
sents a bridge between the humanities and the sciences. These data do not reveal many interesting 
patterns in attitudes toward specific value issues at the level of the academic branch, but they do 
support the conclusion that we will not find common perspectives toward values that cluster accord-
ing to academic branch. Our work is exploratory, though, and so further work is called for both to 
buttress these results and pursue our research question at the level of academic disciplines.
What our data doesn’t illuminate are relationships among assumptions and commitments of 
humanists and those of scientists, relationships that might help us understand the culture gap. We 
have argued that there are a number of important contributions that humanists can make to scien-
tific collaborations that increase the intellectual merit of scientific projects. Among them are contri-
butions that concern the roles that values play in constraining scientific deliberation and decision. 
Given the extensive history of humanists reflecting on the descriptive and normative roles of values 
in science (e.g. Douglas, 2000; Rudner, 1953), along with their outsider (within) status, humanists 
could and should be a bigger part of collaborative interdisciplinary science.
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Notes
1. We agree with Krauss (2009) that the gap remains 
large and largely unbridged. See also the Discussion 
section for reflection on the number of humanists and 
artists in our data-set.
2. While we follow Snow in considering in analyzing 
cultural distinctions between the sciences and arts and 
humanities, we do not share a commitment to there 
being precisely two cultures. It is not obvious that, for 
instance, all the sciences are unified in one scientific 
culture. The method of analysis presented below in 
fact allows for such differences. Therefore, we focus 
on the problem of the culture gap, regardless of how 
many cultures there are, and ways in which the gap or 
gaps can be bridged.
3. To clarify the terminology, “discipline” refers to defined 
research fields with a shared reference frame and 
methodology and some degree of institutionalization 
(e.g. journals, professional associations, and institutes). 
By “branches” we refer to groups of disciplines like “life 
sciences,” “medicine and health sciences,” or “social 
and behavioral sciences.”
4. While the philosophical literature we have canvassed is 
largely about the role that non-epistemic values may 
play in the sciences, the Toolbox prompts use “values” 
without any modifier. In large part, this is because the 
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main function of the prompts is to stimulate thought 
and discussion among workshop participants, leav-
ing it open to them to discover or develop their own 
ways of thinking about the term. One consequence of 
this decision is that the match between the Toolbox 
prompts and the corresponding philosophical theses 
is often imperfect. For example, disagreement with 
the first prompt is consistent with Longino’s position 
on scientific objectivity; however, it is also consistent 
with the view that objectivity requires adhering to 
epistemic values like predictive power but complete 
neutrality with respective to values of any other sort, 
a view that is not congenial toward a scientific role for 
non-epistemic values. We note this mismatch between 
the prompts and associated theses mainly to caution 
the reader against drawing overly strong conclusions 
about where Toolbox respondents tend to stand on the 
more specific philosophical theses.
5. The Digital Commons Three-Tiered Taxonomy of 
Academic Disciplines is a regularly updated taxonomy 
of disciplines that aims to be as comprehensive as rea-
sonably possible by being based on multiple sources, 
including the Taxonomy of Research Doctoral Programs 
from the National Academies, the Classification of In-
structional Programs, 2010 edition, from the National 
Center for Educational Statistics, and The University of 
California’s list of departments and programs. It has 
over 1,000 categories. The first tier divides disciplines 
very generally into 10 larger groups, which we refer 
to as “academic branches.” The second tier is that of 
disciplines (such as Philosophy or Chemistry), and the 
third tier divides among sub-disciplines.
6. For this, we used the participant responses indepen-
dent of their academic branch. However, all partici-
pants who responded “I don’t know” or “N/A” to more 
than one prompt were excluded to avoid a too strong 
bias when calculating the distances. This resulted in 
excluding 11 participants, for a total of 324.
7. Superparamagnetic agent mapping employs self-
organizing agents governed by the dynamics of a 
clustering algorithm inspired by spin physics. Each 
participant can be imagined as a particle with a certain 
spin, where the calculated distances were interpreted 
as the spin coupling of the particles. The algorithm 
then transforms this coupling into a movement on 
the plane, i.e. particles with correlated spins (=similar 
answers) become more attracted to each other. Thus, 
superparamagnetic agent mapping typically produces 
clumping, where several particles clump together (con-
noting similarity) while collectively repelling a different 
cluster (connoting collective difference between the 
two clusters). It has been shown that this method is 
superior to standard methods for dimensionality re-
duction, such as factor analysis, principal components 
analysis, and multidimensional scaling, in preserving 
the topology of the data space with clustered data. For 
a mathematical introduction into this type of cluster-
ing, see Ott, Eggel, and Christen (2014) and Ott, Kern, 
Steeb, and Stoop (2005).
8. Recall that participants could respond to the prompts 
within the Likert scale or with “N/A” or “I don’t know.” 
Those participants not responding in the Likert scale 
were not included in Figure 1. They were, however, in-
cluded in determining the percentages, i.e. the number 
of participants of each branch answering each point 
on the Likert scale were divided by the total number of 
participants for that branch, including those respond-
ing “N/A” or “I don’t know.”
9. The advantage of the Kruskal–Wallis H test over the 
more standard one-way ANOVA is that the Krus-
kal–Wallis test does not assume that the data were 
normally distributed, as ANOVA does. Since our data 
were not normally distributed, the Kruskal–Wallis is the 
preferred method for analyzing variance.
10.  Given the variety of participant responses shown in 
Figure 1, these findings give us some tentative reason 
to think that though there is considerable variance in 
researchers views on whether objectivity implies an ab-
sence of a researcher’s values (Values 1) and whether 
it is advocacy to allow values to influence scientific 
research (Values 5), this difference is not based on the 
branch of academia to which the researcher belongs. 
Interpreting null results (i.e. results that do not reject 
the null hypothesis) can be tricky. Generally, such 
results do not entail that the null hypothesis is true. 
In this case, it remains possible that a disciplinary 
difference on one or all of these issues can be found by 
other experimental means or by simply having more 
participants.
11.  When testing multiple null hypotheses, the likeli-
hood of a false positive (the family-wise error rate) 
increases exponentially based on the number of null 
hypotheses being tested. In this case, 12 MWW tests 
were run, which results in a family-wise error rate of 
approximately 0.46. This means that if each of the 
12 tests was evaluated for significance at the level of 
p < 0.05, then (without correction) there would be a 
46% chance that at least one result reported would be 
a false positive. To control for family-wise error rate, 
we use the Holm–Bonferroni method, which lowers the 
p-value necessary for an individual MWW test to count 
as significant, so that overall the likelihood of a false 
positive is the standard 5%.
12.  As a reminder, our superparamagnetic agent mapping 
technique analyzed participant responses independent 
of their academic branch, and therefore we were able 
to include participants from each of the eight aca-
demic branches. For the algorithm to work, however, 
participants who responded “I don’t know” or “N/A” to 
more than one prompt were excluded since too much 
data would be missing to accurately plot them on the 
map based on which other participants had similar 
responses. This resulted in excluding 11 participants, 
for a total of 324 displayed in the superparamagnetic 
agent map.
13.  The clustering algorithm can also be forced to look for 
a set number of clusters. Since we had eight branches, 
we forced the algorithm to seek exactly eight clusters. 
The clusters that emerge, however, also do not cor-
respond to the academic branches.
14.  Although we focus here on the value of humanities for 
the sciences, it should be noted that we emphasize 
elsewhere (e.g. O’Rourke & Crowley, 2013) that the 
sciences and humanities stand in a feedback loop 
with one another. Each stands to gain from mutual 
interaction, and gain in ways that do not reduce one to 
support staff for the other. We take it that experimen-
tal philosophy provides a nice illustration of this.
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Appendix 1
Table 1A. Summary of one-way Kruskal–Wallis analysis of variance tests by prompt
H p df
Values 1 4.22 0.65 6
Values 2 17.81 0.007 6
Values 3 18.96 0.004 6
Values 4 10.57 0.10 6
Values 5 6.81 0.34 6
Table 2A. Summary of Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test for the prompts Values 2 and 3, comparing 
Life Sciences (LS), Engineering (Eng), Physical Science and Mathematics (PSM), and Social and 
Behavioral Sciences (SBS)
W p
Values 2 LS–Eng 2446 0.48
PSM–Eng 1113.5 0.66
SBS–Eng 1132.5 0.21
PSM–LS 4008 0.10
SBS–LS 4167.5 0.40
SBS–PSM 2432.5 0.03
Values 3 LS–Eng 2095.5 0.89
PSM–Eng 1190 0.80
SBS–Eng 1210 0.03
PSM–LS 4474.5 0.79
SBS–LS * 4639 0.002
SBS–PSM 2586.5 0.006
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